O princípio das possibilidades alternativas

Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade moral; Liberdade; Determinismo.

Resumo

Com o seu artigo de 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt mudou o curso do debate sobre o problema da vontade livre. Ele forneceu exemplos hipotéticos, por meio de experimentos de pensamento, de agentes que, conforme ele argumentou, embora não pudessem ter agido de outro modo, ainda assim seriam moralmente responsáveis pelas suas ações. O artigo de Frankfurt entusiasmou muitos filósofos, destacadamente John Fischer, a repensar o problema da responsabilidade moral. Para Fischer, Frankfurt teria mostrado que o debate não diz mais respeito ao problema de demonstrar a compatibilidade entre liberdade e determinismo, mas, sim, à questão da compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo.

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Biografia do Autor

Tania Schneider da Fonseca, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS)

Doutora em Filosofia pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS), São Leopoldo – RS, Brasil.

Referências

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Publicado
2019-06-13
Como Citar
DA FONSECA, T. O princípio das possibilidades alternativas. Griot : Revista de Filosofia, v. 19, n. 2, p. 230-249, 13 jun. 2019.
Seção
Artigos