The afective dimention of human existence in the light of hermeneutic-phenomneology: the disclosive character in being and time

Abstract

The philosophical interest in relation to the affective dimension of human life and experience is growing and plural. Among these interests are the recent and varied efforts to understand the nature of emotions, especially in relation to various philosophical issues involving human agency. In line with these efforts, Goldie's (2007) proposal consists of a double movement of, on the one hand, presenting a wide and varied set of phenomena that need to be appreciated by any theories of emotion, and, on the other, identifying the extent to which the most prestigious theories of emotion do justice to that richness and phenomenal complexity. The result of this double movement is the critical diagnosis that the hitherto most prestigious theories of emotion, the non-cognitivist, the cognitivist, and the perceptual are deficient from an explanatory point of view. Interestingly, although Martin Heidegger has reserved a decisive position and function for affectivity amidst the project of elaborating fundamental ontology, it is not included in the minutes of much of the current debate on the philosophies of emotion, including the aforementioned critical diagnosis. from Goldie. The main objective of this paper is to present in general the phenomenology of affectivity as unfolded by Heidegger in the late twenties. More specifically, it seeks to show how the affective dimension in general, and mood and emotions in particular, have an eminently revealing openness, which even justifies, from a meta-philosophical perspective, their inclusion in the fundamental ontology program.