An analysis of the third section of the book Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals

Abstract

This article addresses the issue discussed on the third section of the book Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, more precisely the question regarding the a priori synthetic validity of the categorical imperative in determining the human will. Although the moral law is universally recognized by all rational beings, Kant needs to demonstrate its effectiveness with regard to the human will, which is empirically affected. Thus, the Kantian argumentative strategy revolves around an attempt to deduce the moral autonomy of the notion of transcendental freedom, which is impossible, because, in this context, there is still no way to prove the objective validity of such a concept. Despite the effort made by Kant, all the arguments raised here come up against the impossibility of knowing the scope of intelligibility, so that this question will only be carried out in the Critique of Practical Reason.