When we ought silence other people: the positive dimension of epistemic silencing
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v22i1.2619Keywords:
Silencing; Epistemic Injustices; Dignity of the Human Person; Phronesis.Abstract
In this article, we will analyze the positive dimension of silencing for epistemic practices. Since: (a) silencing refers to a communicative impediment; and (b) at least in part our epistemic agency depends on this ability to express and make ourselves understood, it would be possible to conclude that (c) silencing necessarily harms our epistemic interactions. However, Barrett Emerick (2019) reminds us that in some cases silencing helps to preserve the integrity and dignity of those whose epistemic agency is violated. Based on this initial insight, we listed three premises that culminated in the justification for silencing other people: (1) epistemic silences stem from socio-historical processes and the power relations that permeate them; (2) the limits of epistemic agencies are established through social norms and conventions that affect identities in different ways; and, (3) the dignity of the human person must be the criterion for establishing the limits between what should or should not be said. Considering that in order to act correctly it is necessary not only the justifications for acting, but also the appropriate occasion, we defend that practical wisdom (phronesis) is the proper virtue for individuals, groups and institutions to know when to silence other people.
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