The difference between generation and acceptance of scientific theories: an issue to inference to the best explanation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v23i3.3548Keywords:
Inference to the Best Explanation; Abduction; Peter Lipton; Acceptance.Abstract
The Charles Peirce’s abduction argument, or abductive reasoning, was frequently identified in Philosophy of Science’s literature with Gilbert Harman’s inference to the best explanation (IBE). Although very common, that identification was clarified as a mistake, since, while abduction describes a generative process of theories, IBE does a selective process of rival theoretical alternatives. However, Peter Lipton, seeking to develop IBE, introduced a structure quite similar to peircian abduction in order to provide a model that would describe both the processes of generation and selection of theories. The purpose of this paper is to show that the two different conceptions of IBE (Harman's and Lipton's) entail different conceptions of the very notion of acceptance: while Harman views acceptance as a final evaluative step, Lipton places that within of the process of generating a scientific production.
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