For a self-suppression of the method: genealogy as a genealogical program and the dimension of power in Nietzsche

Abstract

Our objective will be to argue in favor of the idea that in Nietzsche there is no genealogical method, stricto sensu, with universalist and systemic-substantivist epistemic claims (traditionally conceived by justificationist and foundationalist philosophies from Plato to Hegel). However, there is a characteristic genealogical program, which opposes the majority genealogies and philosophies insofar as a self-suppression of the method is imposed as the primary and heterodox register of its reflection. We start from the hypothesis that Nietzsche’s genealogy, understood programmatically, became viable because it was markedly structured on the basis of three reflexive movements that free his genealogical thinking from an analytical-methodological conduct, like the canon, which are: (i) variation of style in his writing; (ii) critical historicism or radical and (iii) discontinuity of origin. However, it would be pointless to show how clearly the Nietzschean genealogical program was outlined if we couldn’t say where it came from, for whom and for what purpose, or even more so, what it is intended to denounce. Therefore, in our conclusion, we will show, with some reservation, how the Nietzschean genealogical program lends itself to evaluating the dimension of power.