Observations on the unfolding of the Dichtungsvermögen: its presence and consequence in the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the action of the poetic or inventive imaginative faculty (Dichtungsvermögen) in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, in the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781), and to examine the emphasis that this author attributes to it in his Anthropology. This work defends the thesis that this capacity of the imaginative faculty would have a fundamental role in the development of the subjective deduction presented by Kant in the first edition of his Critique of pure reason, indicating, as it would make it possible to consider from its functioning a theory of psychological judgments, however, we will emphasize that such a possibility would be limited in the Critique, a fact that we consider to add its field of action and investigation to Anthropology, which would characterize this last work as a fertile field for psychological action and investigation.