Heidegger and Husserl: appropriation of the concept of categorical intuition by existencial analytic

Abstract

This article is intended to show a reading of Heidegger's philosophy of Edmund Husserl from the topic of categorical intuition developed by Husserl and their own developments in Heidegger. We defend the hypothesis that when removing the conscience from its traditional approach, in other words, to rid it of psychologism, Husserl propels Heidegger at the inauguration of his hermeneutic phenomenology because consciousness is no longer treated as a natural object and has its ideal character highlighted. This way, we affirm that Heidegger, radicalizing, builds a question that moves the object of phenomenology of consciousness’ area to existence, leaving the theory of knowledge, which Husserl was inserted, going toward an ontology. To this end, we will cover some central concepts of Logical Investigations, then moving on to the analysis of the few fragments which Heidegger explains his relationship with Husserl's work.