Jonathan Lowe's libertarianism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v14i2.708Keywords:
Free will; Libertarianism; Jonathan Lowe; Agent causation; Substance causation.Abstract
The aim of this article is to introduce Jonathan Lowe's version of libertarian free will. Intentional actions are explained when we point out the reasons why agents have taken certain courses of action. An essential feature of these actions would be the agent's ability to deliberate about the circumstances of a particular course of action, before deciding what to do. The issue, in Philosophy of Action, is approached by determinists and their opponents. While determinists are critics of the common sense idea of an action being based on the free exercise of will, other philosophers, such as compatibilists and libertarianistas, offer support to this idea. In particular, Libertarianists argue that we, as free agents, exercise our will without the occurence of previous events that could be identified as a sufficient cause. Jonathan Lowe, in his book Personal Agency (2008), put forward a new version of this theory, by combining our ability to decide freely as rational beings with a new view of causation, namely, the manifestation of powers (and liabilities) by substances. The exercise of the will would be a kind of rational power.
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