Scientific knowledge and philosophy: a discussion of materialism identity from the phenomenology of Husserl
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v14i2.721Keywords:
Materialism; Mind; Brain; Consciousness; NeuroscienceAbstract
In contemporary times, the debates in the field of philosophy of mind when it comes to the brain and its relationship with the mind, predominantly has followed the canons of materialism, represented by the empirical sciences, particularly neuroscience. It is in view of this approach, compared to an intriguing problem in this article, we intend, through the categories of Husserl's phenomenology, reviewing the arguments of materialism shed much discussed within the philosophy of mind, namely, materialism identity. This article is organized and structured around two great moments. First, our objective is to demonstrate what are the most important aspects underlying the identity of materialism positions with regard to studies of the mind and brain problem. Then, from the theoretical assumptions of phenomenology of Husserl, our goal is to demonstrate possible gaps and inconsistencies regarding this kind of materialism.
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