Subjectivity, freedom and action: approaches between Sartre’s phenomenological ontology and Fichte’s transcendental idealism

Abstract

The article aims to find points of approximation on the definition of subjectivity that Sartre exposes in Being and nothingness to the analogue conceptualization from Fichte in Science of knowledge. In order to do so, the strategy adopted here, first, is to analyze how the notion of I as ground arises in the Fichtean thought and culminates in a theory of practical reason that implies in the ontological primacy of action. From this, it will be possible to draw certain points of convergence (and divergence) with the Sartrean operation of founding the cogito in a pre-reflective instância, whose deployment is close to that drawn by Fichte. In a word, the intention is to show how the thought of both authors results in a practical philosophy whose leitmotiv is the purge of any index of reification of consciousness, thus, in the proclamation of the absolute freedom of the subject.