A moving absolute: considerations on monism and pluralism in Bergson

Abstract

Traditional metaphysics, according to Henri Bergson (1859-1941), frequently, immobilizes the real on the basis of a static conception of being. Against the traces left by Kantianism, and strangely opposed to tradition, Bergson intends to recreate metaphysics as the immediate experience of a moving absolute, duration. At the outset we encounter a problem: in his works, the conception of a single duration has an apparent ambiguity, after all, his philosophy is known for dealing with themes such as multiplicity, differences of nature, continuity, movement, all pointing to a peculiar notion of reality as creation. The so-called "Bergsonian monism" would then contain a series of misunderstandings and inconsistencies, which the philosopher's texts would not have solved satisfactorily, and the supplementary literature, in turn, seems to treat the subject insufficiently. Thus, to investigate the question of monism / pluralism in Bergsonian thought is central to the understanding of the proposal of a new metaphysics. From the exegesis of passages from the work of 1907, The Creative Evolution, we will discuss the understanding of duration as a totality, asking how far this idea would or would not refer to a monistic view of the real. After all, a reading of Duration and simultaneity (1922) made evident to us the defense of an absolute duration, and, as we have seen in Matter and memory (1897), for Bergson, even the matter is duration. But until then the monist thesis is not verified, since the duration carries several streams and the essay of 1922 is in charge to clarify this multiplicity.