A inquiry to ostrich nominalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v18i2.917Keywords:
Nominalismo; Comprometimento Ontológico; Regresso ao infinito.Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the Ostrich Nominalism. At first, I attempt a clarification of main theses of Devitt. In addition, I analyze whether this kind of nominalism can be considered a solution to the problem of universals. After arguing that this theory does not consider the problem of universals a pseudoproblem, I discuss three criticisms against Ostrich Nominalism. Ontological commitment is the topic of first criticism. I argue that this notion does not provide a sufficient ontological criterion. Later, I analyze the regress infinite argument. The ostrich nominalist argues that all relational solutions to the problem of universals have this problem. However, I advocate that infinite regress argument does not refute all relational solutions. Finally, I analyze an external criticism. Rodriguez-Pereyra maintains that ostrich nominalism cannot be understood as a truthmaking theory.
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