The problem of peer disagreement in contemporary epistemology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v21i1.2160Keywords:
Disagreement; Epistemic peers; Epistemology of disagreements.Abstract
Recently, contemporary epistemology come systematically discussing the theme of disagreement. In our everyday life, although many cases can be seen as merely apparent disagreements, there are also some cases where disputes are legitimates and the disagreements are real. But, would be possible to occur real disagreements between agents we consider epistemic peers? If that is possible, how can we react to these cases, in others words, what is the correct rational attitude in cases of peer disagreements? These are some of the main questions raised by what we call epistemology of disagreements. The aim of this article is to offer a general vision of this contemporary debate. Firstly, i will to present the problem and demonstrate why the scenario of disagreement - mainly between epistemic peers - would be an important philosophical question. Then, i will to present the main theoretical alternatives that arose on the contemporary epistemology as an answers to this problem. Therefore, the aim of this article is to be explanatory it not search for any original position on this debate.
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